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STATEMENT OF ISSUE
(1) Did the trial court err in refusing to remand for a
new preliminary hearing to be heard by a judge not sitting within
the Fifth Circuit Court.

-iii-
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent
v.

:

BLAINE D. CASPER,

:

Case No. 20556

Defendant-Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellant, Darrell Blaine Casper, [hereinafter
referred to as the defendant] appeals from a conviction and
judgment imposed for Aggravated Burglary, a felony of the first
degree pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203 (1953 as amended); and
for Aggravated Assault, a Felony of the Third Degree, pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103 (1953 as amended) in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge, presiding.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 10, 1984, the defendant went to the home of
his former girlfriend, Connie Jo Ungricht [hereinafter referred to
as the victim] to discuss the possibility of continuing their
relationship.

Upon being refused entry, the defendant, who had

been drinking (T. 4) broke down a door and entered the home
26-28).
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{

An argument ensued, with the defendant repeatedly
indicating he wished them to marry and move to Montana (T. 9 ) .
The victim's rejection, when combined with the defendant's upset
emotional state, caused the defendant to unintentionally strike
her with a single blow to the abdomen, using the butt of a rifle.
At no time did the defendant aim the rifle at the victim and no
shots were fired (T. 3-4).
The defendant subsequently remained with the victim and
her young son for several hours.

Concerned about the medical

condition of the victim, the defendant drove her and her son to a
local hospital for treatment (T. 9 ) .
On December 13, 1984, Judge Grant transferred the
defendant's file from Salt Lake City to West Valley for a
preliminary hearing (T. 46, R. 4 ) . The basis of the transferral
was that the victim was a long-time employee of the Fifth Circuit
Court and in court on a daily basis (T. 41). In addition, the
victim was known personally by the prosecutor (T. 41).
On January 8, 1985, a preliminary hearing was conducted
before Judge Tyrone Medley (T. 62, R. 4 ) . Counsel for the
defendant subsequently moved the District Court to remand for a
new preliminary hearing (R. 41) (Addendum A ) .

The basis of the

motion was bias since the hearing was conducted before a judge of
the same circuit in which the victim was employed (T. 44). The
motion was denied (T. 64).

-2-
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The defendant subsequently entered pleas of guilty as to
Aggravated Burglary and Aggravated Assault in exchange for the
dismissal of the kidnapping counts (T. 65). The defendant was
sentenced five years to life for Aggravated Burglary and zero to
five years for Aggravated Assault (T. 166), with the sentences
running concurrently (T. 164).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The defendant submits that the court erred in refusing to
remand the case for a new preliminary hearing before a judge not
sitting on a Fifth Circuit bench.

The bias associated with the

hearing violated the defendant's right to a fair trial before an
impartial magistrate.
ARGUMENT
FAILURE TO MOVE THE DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY
HEARING OUTSIDE THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT DENIED
HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BEFORE AN IMPARTIAL
MAGISTRATE.
The right of a criminal defendant to a fair trial is the
"foundation stone upon which our present judicial system rests."
State v. Brown, 602 P.2d 478, 480 (Arizona 1979).

This

indespensible right to a trial presided over by a judge who is
impartial and free of bias or prejudice is protected by the
Constitution of the State of Utah, Article VIII, Section 13, which
states that:
"Except by consent of all the parties, no judge of the
Supreme or inferior courts shall preside in a trial of
any cause where either of the parties shall be connected
with him by affinity or consanguinity within the degree
of first cousin, or in which he may have been of counsel,
or in the trial of which he may have presided in any
inferior court.
-3-
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As a further protection of a defendant's right to a fair
trial, Utah Code Ann. §77-35-29 (1953 as amended), provides that:
If the prosecution or a defendant in any criminal action
or proceeding shall file an affidavit that the judge
before whom such action or proceeding is to be tried or
heard has a bias or prejudice, either against such party
or his attorney or in favor of any opposing party to the
suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein until
the challenge is disposed of.
The general practice in the State of Utah has been for
judges to disqualify themselves whenever an affidavit of bias and
prejudice against them has been filed Haslam v. Morrison, 190 P.2d
520, 523 (Utah 1948).

The Supreme Court has noted that such a

disqualification is commendable since, "the purity and integrity
of the judicial process ought to be protected against any taint of
suspicion to the end that the public and litigants may have the
highest confidence in the integrity and fairness of the courts."
Id. While the mere filing of an affidavit of bias and prejudice
does not disqualify a judge, this Court has concluded that,

n

. . . it is ordinarily better for a judge to disqualify
himself even though he may be entirely free of bias and
prejudice . . . .
(since) next in importance to the duty
of rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing it in
such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness
or integrity of the judge." Id.
At the trial below, the defendant submitted an affidavit
requesting that the trial court remand the cause for a new
preliminary hearing before a Circuit Court Judge other than one
from the Fifth Circuit. The basis of the motion was that the
victim was an employee of the Circuit Court and well known to the
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other employees of the Court (R. 41-42).

The trial judge denied

the motion and the defendant claims error.
The rule generally followed throughout the United States
is that the words "bias" and "prejudice" refer to the mental
attitude or disposition of the judge toward a party to the
litigation, and not to any views that he might entertain regarding
the subject matter involved.
1980).

State v. Foy, 607 P.2d 481 (Kansas

"Bias" and "Prejudice" mean a hostile feeling or spirit of

ill will against one of the litigants, or undue friendship or
favoritism toward one.

State ex rel. Mitchell v. Sage Stores Co.,

143 P.2d 652, 655 (Kansas 1943).

Thus, in determining whether or

not a trial judge should be disqualified is not a question of
"whether the trial judge believes the accused guilty, but whether
the trial judge can give him (the defendant) a fair trial."

State

v. Hendrix, 363 P.2d 522, 523 (Kansas 1961); see also, Haslam v.
Morrison, supra at 523, State v. Byington, 200 P.2d 723 (Utah
1948).
In the present case, there is clearly a possibility for
bias among all the judges of the Fifth Circuit.

The victim, as an

employee of the Fifth Circuit, was in court on a daily basis.

In

addition, the victim was a friend of the prosecutor (T. 43-44) and
the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association refused to represent the
defendant because of familiarity with the victim (T. 45-46).
In Haslam v. Morrison, supra, this Court discussed the
degree of bias or prejudice necessary to disqualify a judge from
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hearing a case.

After noting the importance of a fair trial the

Court cautioned that
"even if the judge concludes that the affiant is sincere
in his belief that he, the judge, is biased against him,
it ordinarily is well for such judge not to try the case
for the. very reason that he may unconsciously lean toward
such litigant to demonstrate that he is not biased toward
him. And unless the judge is entirely insensitive to
criticism and a revealed state of a litigant's mind, he
may be rendering his judgment from a mind not entirely
free from emotion." Id., at 524.
The trial court indicated concern for the timeliness of
the filing of the motion (T. 48-49).

While the motion for remand

was submitted after the preliminary hearing, the reason was a
mistake on the part of the trial attorney who believed the hearing
was outside the Fifth Circuit

(T. 46-47).

Such an error should

not prejudice the defendant when such an important right is at
stake.
Hawaii wisely allows an appeal such as in the present
case when the defendant shows good cause.

Hawaii Revised Stat.

§601-7(b) (1980), requires that a judge shall be disqualified when
a sufficient affidavit is filed before a hearing is held and, if
not, when cause shall be shown.

Yorta v. Okumoto, 643 P.2d 820,

824 (Hawaii 1982) .

It is important to note that the transfer of the preliminary
hearing by the prosecutor indicates, at a minimum, that there
existed a possibility of unfairness with regard to the defendant
since the victim was a court employee.

-6-
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Clearly, a mistake by an attorney as to potential
prejudice should not thereby prevent a subsequent appeal when the
issue is the fairness of the trial itself.

As this Court has

noted, "The purity and integrity of the judicial process ought to
be protected against any taint of suspicion to the end that the
public and litigants may have the highest confidence in the
integrity and fairness of the courts.

(Emphasis added)

State v.

Byingtony supra at 726.
In the present case, the defendant was clearly prejudiced
as a result of bias by the magistrate.

The facts of the case, the

breaking and entering with intent to commit an assault, indicate
the defendant had no intention of committing a burglary (T. 8-10).
Yet, the third degree assault was used to bootstrap three other
charges, one for burglary and two for aggravated kidnapping (T.
11, R. 26-28), all of which are first degree felonies.
Additionally, the transcript reveals that the charge of
aggravated kidnapping with regard to the boy (Count IV) was bound
over even though there was no testimony supporting the charge (T.
48-49).

Not only did the boy not testify, but all other testimony

indicates the boy never even knew the assault on his mother was
taking place (T. 49).
Such a situation clearly indicates the defendant was not
treated with fairness at the preliminary hearing.

A similar

situation existed in Cline v. Sawyer, 600 P.2d 725 (Wyoming 1979).
There the court considered the question of when suspected bias is
sufficient to warrant a remand.

They noted:
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The "bias" which is a ground for disqualification of a
judge must be personal, and it must be such a condition
of mind which sways judgment and renders the judge unable
to exercise his functions impartially in a given case or
which is inconsistent with a state of mind fully open to
the conviction which evidence might produce. .Id. at
729.
After the charges were bound over to Third District Court
defendant was left in the dubious position of going to trial on
all charges, or entering into a plea arrangement and pursuing his
appeal to this court.
to enter the plea.

Given the lack of options defendant chose

That choice should in no way affect his

petition to this court.

The defendant's plea was entered after

the error and was only a response to the unfair position directly
caused by the magistrates bias.
The binding over of all four counts when there was
clearly insufficient information denied the defendant a fair
trial.

At a minimum, the circumstances create a "suspicion" of

bias sufficient to reverse and remand under this Court's rulings
in Byington and Haslam.
CONCLUSION
Darrell Blaine Casper requests this Court to reverse his f
conviction and remand the cause for a new preliminary hearing
before a magistrate not sitting as a judge from the Fifth Circuit.
Since the victim is a well known employee of the Fifth Circuit,
the remand is necessary to ensure the defendant of his right to a
fair trial.
Respectfully submitted this

day of December, 1985.

JAMES C. BRADSHAW
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, JAMES C. BRADSHAW, hereby certify that four copies of
the foregoing Appellant's Brief will be delivered to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
84114, this

day of December, 1985.

JAMES C. BRADSHAW
Attorney for Appellant

DELIVERED by

this

of December, 1985.
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ANDERSON

St HOLLAND

JOHN B. ANDERSON -7091
Attorney for Defendant.
62 3 East First South
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Telephone: (801) 363-9345
IN THE THIRD
SALT

STATE

JUDICIAL

:OJ

^/.Til^C^

DISTRICT

LAKE COUNTY,

COURT

IN AND FOR

STATE OF UTAH

OF UTAH,

Plaintiff,

MOTION TO REMAND

vs.
C-rV~I-L NO. CIR.CRT.. 84FS2615
t'A:JT-

BLAINE D. CASPER,

CJ^T

\/:l

ISS-S'^J

JUDGE JAY S. BANKS
• )

Defendant.

COMES NOW, the Defendant by and through his attorney,
JOHN 3. ANDERSON, and moves to remand this cause for a new
preliminary hearing before a Circuit Court Judge other than the
Fifth Circuit on the grounds that the victim, Connie Ungricht
is employed as a secretary by the Fifth Circuit Court and the
Judge who heard the preliminary hearing, the Honorable Tyrone
Medley is a Judge of the Fifth Circuit and because of bias, the
Defendant was denied a fair hearing under his constitutional
rights to due process and equal protection.

The Prosecutor

recognized this bias by having the Preliminary Hearing, in the
West Valley Division rather than the Salt Lake Division of the
Fifth Circuit Court.

Nonetheless the Judge hearing the cause

is still a Judge of the Fifth Circuit.
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